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This paper provides an overview of the lessons learned from the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center’s (GSFC) Flight Dynamics 
Facility’s (FDF) support of the Time History of Events and Macroscale Interactions during 
Substorms (THEMIS) spacecraft emergency in February 2007, and the Tracking and Data 
Relay Satellite-3 (TDRS-3) spacecraft emergency in March 2006. A successful and timely 
recovery from both of these spacecraft emergencies depended on accurate knowledge of the 
orbit. Unfortunately, the combination of each spacecraft emergency with very little tracking 
data contributed to difficulties in estimating and predicting the orbit and delayed recovery 
efforts in both cases. In both the THEMIS and TDRS-3 spacecraft emergencies, numerous 
factors contributed to problems with obtaining nominal tracking data measurements. This 
paper details the various causative factors and challenges. This paper further enumerates 
lessons learned from FDF’s recovery efforts involving the THEMIS and TDRS-3 spacecraft 
emergencies and scant tracking data, as well as recommendations for improvements and 
corrective actions. In addition, this paper describes the broad range of resources and 
complex navigation methods employed within the FDF for supporting critical navigation 
activities during all mission phases, including launch, early orbit, and on-orbit operations. 
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DSS = Deep Space Station 
UTC = Universal Time Coordinated 
 
I. Introduction 
The Flight Dynamics Facility (FDF) was tasked to support Time History of Events and Macroscale Interactions 
during Substorms (THEMIS) in a limited capacity, providing backup orbit determination support for validation 
purposes for all five THEMIS probes during launch plus 30 days in coordination with the University of California 
Berkeley Flight Dynamics Center (UCB/FDC). However, various challenges starting on launch day, February 17, 
2007, and a spacecraft emergency declared 30 hours after launch placed the FDF team in the role of providing the 
orbit solutions that enabled contact with each of the probes and the eventual termination of the spacecraft 
emergency. This paper details the challenges and various techniques used by the GSFC FDF team to successfully 
perform orbit determination for all five THEMIS probes during the early mission when there were sparse tracking 
measurements to support orbit determination and prediction. 
The FDF provides routine orbit navigation services for all Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRSs), 
including TDRS-3. On March 22, 2006, there was a spacecraft emergency which put TDRS-3 in Sun–pointing 
mode, causing thrusting and considerable orbit perturbation and tumbling. Contact with TDRS-3 was lost for 3 
hours. During the recovery process, thrusters fired in an unknown configuration for nearly 2 hours and created an 
unexpected drift rate of 3 degrees per day. The 3-degree drift rate is unusually large, comparable to several 
repositioning burns, whereas a typical station keeping maneuver induces a drift rate change of ~0.04 degree per day. 
The TDRS controlling facility, White Sands Complex (WSC), had difficulty in characterizing the thruster firings. 
This paper details the tribulations and various orbit determination methods employed by the GSFC FDF team to 
recover the TDRS-3 spacecraft from the spacecraft emergency by successfully performing orbit determination with 
sparse tracking measurements. 
II. Spacecraft Emergency Summary 
A. THEMIS Overview 
THEMIS is a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)-funded Medium Explorer mission 
(MIDEX) managed by the Explorers Program Office at GSFC in Greenbelt, Maryland. The THEMIS mission 
consists of five space probes, THEMIS A through THEMIS E, in elliptical low-inclination, high-Earth orbits. As the 
primary provider of flight dynamics services, the THEMIS Flight Dynamics Center (FDC), which is collocated with 
the Mission Operations Center (MOC) at the University of California at Berkeley (UCB), is responsible for 
performing orbit determination using the Goddard Trajectory Determination System (GTDS) through the entire 
mission and providing all acquisition data to the supporting ground stations. As backup to UCB/FDC, the FDF 
located at NASA GSFC was tasked to provide backup orbit determination using GTDS for the first 30 days of the 
mission and again during the Ascent Phase beginning in September 2007 for approximately 70 days. Therefore, the 
FDF team had a limited role in the navigation support for THEMIS. Orbit determination solutions and predictions 
are required for the support of onboard attitude processing, reduction of scientific measurements, and detailed 
maneuver planning, as well as generation of antenna acquisition data. 
Constellation management is always a challenge, especially during the critical launch and early orbit mission 
phase. As stated, THEMIS is a constellation mission comprising five identical, yet separate spacecraft probes. All 
five probes were launched on and deployed from one Delta II launch vehicle. The Delta payload/probe carrier was 
designed such that THEMIS A was deployed in the velocity direction, whereas the remaining probes, THEMIS B 
through THEMIS E, were arranged around the carrier’s circumference and deployed radially. There was no 
guidance telemetry at payload separation and the probe carrier was spinning. The Delta Acquisition Assistance 
Message (AAM) for THEMIS was generated after the 2nd stage "piloted" burn, using telemetry from the first two 
stages with the nominal 3rd stage performance added and propagated to payload separation. Unfortunately, the Delta 
AAM did not model residual thrusting or the spinning of the probe carrier. Thus there was no definitive separation 
state knowledge for any of the probes. The only distinction that could be made was that THEMIS A was to be 
released 3 seconds prior to THEMIS B through THEMIS E. Having only one spacecraft separation vector for all five 
probes introduced error into the critical launch day orbit determination process. However, any difference was 
estimated to be below the expected propagation error and any uncertainty of the last known state. 




An obvious flight dynamics challenge was managing all five probes simultaneously, particularly in their launch 
and early orbit phase. In addition, all five probes shared identical transponders with identical frequencies, thus 
increasing the potential for misidentified tracking data. Fortunately, these risks were never realized. 
Tracking support for the five THEMIS spacecraft is provided by the NASA’s Ground Network (GN) antennas, 
including the Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), Merritt Island (MIL), and Santiago, Chile (AGO) tracking stations. 
Although not a part of the NASA GN, both the Berkeley Ground Station (BGS) and the Hartebeesthoek Ground 
Station (HBK), in South Africa, also provide THEMIS tracking services, with BGS being the prime THEMIS 
Mission antenna. FDF was only tasked to validate HBK’s ability to track and provide usable coherent Doppler 
tracking data. The ground station’s tracking data had not been certified to any level of accuracy or quality prior to 
launch. UCB/FDC independently verified and accepted the HBK tracking data quality and accuracy. 
B. THEMIS Sequence of Events 
THEMIS was successfully launched on Friday, 2007-02-17 23:01:00 UTC. The Delta II ascent to orbit was 
nominal with THEMIS A separation occurring at 2007-02-18 00:14:14 UTC followed by THEMIS B through 
THEMIS E at 2007-02-18 00:14:17 UTC. The TDRS System (TDRSS) was scheduled to monitor the separation 
event, but no tracking data was provided since the TDRSS event was scheduled as a White Sands Complex Data 
Interface Service (WDISC) service, which provides telemetry and command data only. There were no problems 
noted during the TDRSS contact or the BGS contacts that immediately followed.  
The Delta AAM state vector compared well with the pre-launch nominal; therefore, UCB/FDC decided not to 
update the network acquisition data. However, subsequent orbit solutions for all five probes indicated that the launch 
vehicle performance placed the THEMIS spacecraft 63.9% low on the achieved orbital period compared to the 
allowable launch vehicle dispersions. The launch vehicle dispersion allowances for the THEMIS orbit were 1999 +/- 
180 minutes for the orbital period, 435 +/- 6 km for perigee altitude, and 16 +/- 0.5 degree for inclination. With such 
a large spread in orbital period permitted, the resultant orbit could produce extremely large instantaneous position 
errors compared to the mission nominal. Comparisons between the Delta AAM and pre-launch nominal could not 
identify the error in the Delta AAM vector, since it was a modeled propagation of a nominal 3rd stage performance. 
The unexpected launch vehicle performance translated into a 2-hour difference between the actual spacecraft period 
and the Delta AAM modeled separation state, with the actual period being 31.4 hours versus the 33.3-hour period 
modeled in the Delta AAM vector. See Table 1 for a comparison between the AAM separation state and that 
computed by FDF. This underperformance error in the Delta AAM state, which was used as the a priori state in the 
orbit determination process for all five probes, had an impact on critical early orbit determination and contributed to 
the THEMIS early mission difficulties. 
 
Another contributing error was a spacecraft RF anomaly
5
 causing significantly weaker downlink signal strength 
than expected, which was aggravated by less than ideal antenna to ground orientations. Since all five probes shared 
identical RF designs, they all suffered from this RF communication anomaly. The onboard RF anomaly was further 
compounded by the apparent link margin problems observed with certain antennas tracking the THEMIS probes 
around apogee. The WFF 11-meter antenna experienced extreme difficulty acquiring the very weak THEMIS 
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Table 1. Comparison of the Delta AAM and the FDF Determined States 
Parameter AAM Value FDF Value Difference 
Epoch (UTC) 2008-02-18 00:14:08.414 2008-02-18 00:14:08.414 0 
X (km) 6484.8464 6485.26514941607 -0.418749 
Y (km) -3998.9338 -4007.03639711802 7.14302 
Z (km) -23.620889 -22.9429770845846 -0.677912 
Vx (km/s) 7.3560188 7.34595828420958 0.0100605 
Vy (km/s) 6.0284782 6.00830459333473 0.0201736 
Vz (km/s) 2.5693697 2.57353917501606 -0.00416948 
Osculating period 
(min) 
1999.526 1884.305 115.221 
Osculating perigee 
altitude (km) 
435.306 436.618 -1.31436 
Osculating inclination 
(deg) 
16.004 16.037 -0.033 
 




downlink signal. The on-board spacecraft RF anomaly coupled with the poor spacecraft antenna geometry with 
respect to the supporting ground stations and the link margin problems all resulted in very little usable coherent 
Universal Tracking Data Format (UTDF) Doppler tracking data being collected during the critical initial orbit phase 
immediately following spacecraft separation. With the large errors in the propagated Delta AAM vector coupled 
with sparse coherent Doppler tracking data, initial orbit determination and estimation was difficult for THEMIS A, 
B, and E and estimation of the THEMIS C and D was not possible. Without orbital estimation results, there were no 
antenna acquisition data updates available on launch day based on orbit determination. 
The actual insertion orbit quickly diverged from that which was modeled in the pre-launch nominal acquisition 
data. In conjunction with the on-board RF anomaly, communication difficulties quickly escalated and eventually 
resulted in negative acquisitions, loss of communications with all probes, and ultimately in declaring a Spacecraft 
Emergency on 2007-02-19 04:30 UTC, only 30 hours after launch. 
The majority of early mission passes on the THEMIS probes did not result in a successful acquisition of signal. 
The stations often then shifted to manual track, sweeping the antennas for a “hit” on the spacecraft. Tracking data 
from these contacts had to be used very judiciously, as all the resultant measurements were not good except for a 
couple, as the antenna was in effect on program track, with no RF from the spacecraft. In order to use this data, it 
was necessary for orbit determination analysts to talk to the ground station to determine if the antenna operator got 
any “hit” or contacts on the spacecraft during the sweep. 
1. Detailed THEMIS Tracking Challenges 
Although GN UTDF Doppler data was the only expected tracking data type prior to launch, angle tracking data 
from various supporting GN sites was absolutely critical during the first few days after launch for orbit 
determination and Spacecraft Emergency recovery. Of the certified THEMIS GN sites, only Wallops (WFF), Merritt 
Island (MIL), and Santiago (AGO) have the capability to provide angle tracking measurements. With the RF and 
link margin issues, angle tracking data came into FDF flagged invalid because there was a low signal to noise ratio, 
which prevented the validity trigger in the antenna system, hence all of the tracking data was marked invalid from 
launch forward for THEMIS. FDF evaluated the invalid angle data and determined that, although the measurements 
were invalid, the angle tracking was usable. In order to use the invalid angle tracking data in the orbit solutions, FDF 
had to manually configure the orbit system to override the validity flag, which was crucial in getting the solutions 
that enabled communication with the THEMIS probes. 
Over the first few days after THEMIS launch, using the initial Wallops pass, with data flagged as invalid from 
THEMIS A, FDF was able to generate and provide the best initial post-launch orbit solution that was used to update 
the station acquisition data, re-establishing communication with all five probes and terminating the Spacecraft 
Emergency. This solution was built from a couple of manual track hits on THEMIS A, as well as the first contact 
right after separation from BGS. This solution was crucial to recovery of all the mission orbits due to the quickly 
evolving Spacecraft Emergency. It was only by bootstrapping this initial solution for THEMIS A, using the Wallops 
angle data, that good orbit solutions were achievable for THEMIS B through THEMIS E. 
In an attempt to improve communication with the probes using antennas with greater link margins, the HBK 
facility began their support using uplinks and downlinks from the 10-meter antenna. Due to the troubled downlinks, 
the station attempted multiple configurations, eventually settling on a dual configuration consisting of a 6-meter 
transmit antenna and a 12-meter receive antenna. However, the tracking data from this HBK dual configuration was 
not properly labeled, because the UTDF tracking data from these events still used the antenna identifiers of the 10-
meter antenna, as this was the expected nominal antenna validated for THEMIS support by UCB/FDC. In order to 
correctly process and use the HBK 6-meter/12-meter antenna tracking data, FDF had to manipulate the tracking data 
and overwrite the transmit and receive antenna identification codes. The 6-meter/12-meter antenna configuration 
was a new antenna for FDF and not included in the station files used by the FDF or UCB/FDC orbit ground systems. 
In order to correctly process and use the HBK 6-meter/12-meter tracking data, FDF had to manually configure the 
orbit determination system to correctly recognize the tracking station and use the correct station geodetic 
information. FDF reset this data to be the proper stations by overwriting the transmit and receive sites on its Oracle 
SQL database used to store the raw data. Since the HBK 6-meter/12-meter was a previously unused antenna 
configuration, FDF first had to quickly research and analyze the geodetics for this antenna to ensure proper 
performance while under this Spacecraft Emergency, a process that is generally performed with multi-station 
tracking with known references for comparisons. This process was repeatedly necessary for the constellation of 
THEMIS spacecraft through the early mission support. Existing lines of communication between FDF and various 
elements of the tracking networks were crucial to verifying the HBK configurations used for each pass. 
Unfortunately, UCB/FDC had no convenient means of properly overwriting and processing this tracking data. FDF 
extracted the reprocessed data from its Oracle database, converted it to 60-byte sequential GTDS input tracking data 






, and sent this data to UCB/FDC. FDF provided consultation on how to manually configure orbit systems to use 
correct station geodetic information. 
Orbit determination was originally planned to be based exclusively on two-way NASA GN UTDF Doppler 
tracking data. Spacecraft RF link margin issues and problems with antenna patterns during the early orbit mission 
phase led the FDF team to recommend additional support from the NASA Deep Space Network (DSN) after the 
THEMIS Spacecraft Emergency was issued. Therefore, although the GN antennas were the primary source of 
tracking data for THEMIS, DSN tracking data supplemented the GN data and was critical to early orbit estimation. 
Since the DSN was not configured to support THEMIS, the DSN sent all the THEMIS tracking data identified as 
TDRS-10 or as ChipSat, satellites they had supported before. This required FDF to perform data overrides for all of 
the DSN tracking data, as well; again, a laborious and intensive project while supporting five probes. Since 
UCB/FDC was not configured for DSN support, no network interface existed between UCB/FDC and the DSN. 
FDF generated and delivered to the DSN acquisition data to enable the antenna support for UCB/FDC. In addition, 
UCB/FDC could not command THEMIS nor receive DSN telemetry or tracking data. There were a number of issues 
related to the DSN not being configured for supporting THEMIS that impacted FDF support. The DSN was able to 
track only in a three-way mode when another one of the THEMIS certified GN sites was tracking simultaneously. In 
order to properly process and use the DSN and simultaneous GN tracking data, FDF had to manipulate the data to 
add in three-way overrides to the appropriate tracking measurements. Since in the majority of cases the data had 
already been accumulated, the data had to be replayed to reset the 3-way overrides to the data, or the data had to be 
directly manipulated to be the correct configuration. Again, this was laborious for five spacecraft throughout the 
support. Since GN Doppler UTDF tracking data was the only expected data type that UCB/FDC expected to receive 
prior to launch, the UCB/FDC orbit system was only configured to support this data type. The DSN provided 
valuable angle data, as well as Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) TRK-2-34 formatted Doppler data types during 
THEMIS support. In order for UCB/FDC to be able to process and use the DSN tracking data correctly, FDF 
provided a 60-byte sequential input tracking data file to UCB/FDC and consultation on how to set up and use this 
tracking data type in GTDS 
2. THEMIS Lessons Learned 
For missions that have large possible launch dispersions, even a slight difference from nominal could produce 
situations that will rapidly degrade into contingency situations. The best posture for these situations is to be prepared 
before launch to work with the launch dispersion cases quickly. Further, using launch vehicle inertial guidance data 
can be risky, especially when the final stages are only modeled. It is better to ensure that the launch vehicle data is 
available from all stages, a process that can be a mission criterion for the launch planning. It is better yet to ensure 
that the launch vehicle is tracked by ground antennas with tracking data to enable an independent verification of the 
separation state. This technique is often used for FDF-supported missions. Used in combination with a spectrum of 
possible dispersion data, the data will quickly yield the correct launch information for the new missions. 
The prime consideration during an early orbit period is to determine the newly launched mission’s orbit as 
quickly as possible, to prevent the outcome of poor acquisition and communications, as happened in this 
complicated support for the THEMIS mission. The THEMIS situation was also greatly exacerbated by the 
simultaneous support of five spacecraft, which also constrained the possible tracking contacts dedicated to any of the 
spacecraft. 
THEMIS has been successfully recovered from its Spacecraft Emergency. FDF continued to support UCB/FDC 
through launch plus 60 days, an extension from the original launch plus 30 day support plan. After the post-launch 
60-day support period, FDF support subsided to a proficiency level of only one orbit solution per probe per month. 
C. TDRS-3 Overview 
The NASA TDRSS enables communication with and tracking of Earth-orbiting spacecraft. The system is 
composed of nine spacecraft in low-inclination geosynchronous orbits positioned in assigned longitudinal slots 
around the Earth and the ground systems used to track and control them. A TDRS is controlled through the WSC 
located in White Sands, New Mexico, under the direction of the Space Network (SN) Project of Code 452 at 
NASA’s GSFC. The FDF at GSFC is responsible for TDRS orbit determination and prediction. 
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Nominal tracking data support for TDRS-3 includes S-band Bilateration Ranging Transponder System (BRTS) 
tracking from Alice Springs, Australia, every 4 hours and K-band Tracking Telemetry and Command (TT&C) data 
from Guam (GRGT) every hour. 
D. TDRS-3 Sequence of Events 
On March 22, 2006, TDRS–3 had an Emergency Time Out (ETO) resulting in an attitude divergence leading to a 
protracted period of loss of service. The anomaly included significant thrusting for more than 2 hours until near 
0300 UTC, which accounted for nearly 90% of the total thrusting during the ETO. Minor thrusting continued for 
another 10 hours until approximately 1300 UTC and accounted for the remaining 10% of the total thrusting 
experienced during the ETO. The spacecraft was then drifting westward at a rate of 3 degrees per day. The FDF 
found that the orbit change from the thrusting was approximately 4,380 km in orbital position after 32 hours. Table 2 
shows the order of events adapted from the timeline as reported by the FDF. 
 
1. Detailed TDRS-3 Tracking Challenges 
To avoid interference with other spacecraft, K-band tracking was prohibited, which barred S–band BRTS 
tracking data and GRGT K–band TT&C data. (K–band space–to–ground service is required to achieve TDRS–to–
User tracking in either S– or K–band.) Being only able to program track, Guam was unable to provide any usable 
angle data for orbit determination. Further eliminating Guam tracking data were very large and changing range 
biases. Guam had at least four groups of range data biased by integrals of ~37.5 km, ranging from between -412 and 
-640 km. 
As the contingency tracking station for TDRS-3, the Canberra, Australia Deep Space Station, DSS-46, assisted 
in the recovery efforts. Given the low elevations for observing TDRS-3 from Canberra, DSS-46 had difficulty 
maintaining lock. Further exasperating the situation was competition from the concurrent Space Technology 5 (ST5) 
mission’s launch and early orbit support for both DSN and FDF staff and resources. 
The data received from the Canberra site were the only good data received by the time the first orbit update was 
attempted at 01:00 UTC on March 23. However, the data covered only slightly more than a quarter of the orbit, not 
enough for a solution with data from a single station and with poorly known a priori elements. In response to a large 
unplanned orbit change, this initial orbit solution was poor with very little tracking data, much less than normal 
operations, and also had inadequate tracking geometry. 
It was not until USSTRATCOM provided a better initial state vector that the FDF was successful in processing 
the tracking data and updating the TDRS-3 orbit at approximately 2100 UTC on March 23. This initial orbit solution 
Table 2. TDRS-3 2006 Anomaly 
Date Event 
3/22 Loss of attitude control and loss of Earth reference. 
3/22 End of 90 percent of thrusting. 
3/22 
End of last 10 percent of thrusting. Tracking data taken during this period were 
unusable due to thrusting. 
3/22 TDRS-3 returned to normal mode, S-band TT&C tracking only. 
3/22 FDF provided solution based on pre-maneuver data. 
3/22 First pass of DSS–46 data received. 
3/23 Third and last pass of DSS–46 data received. 
3/23 FDF reported being unable to generate a usable solution from the data. 
3/23 
The first post-tumble United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) solution 
was received. 
3/23 
FDF obtained a converged solution from three Canberra passes over a 7–hour arc 
using the USSTRATCOM vector as initial conditions. 
3/23 FDF delivered a converged solution. 
3/24 Maneuver to stop drift. 
3/24 Maneuver to return the spacecraft to its box (to start drift back).  
3/24 Resumption of BRTS events. 
3/28 Maneuver to slow drift. 
3/28 Maneuver to stop drift and stay in the box. 
3/28 TDRS-3 emergency terminated. 
 




was based on selective tracking data. DSS-46 Doppler data and Guam range data were excluded whereas angle data 
from both Guam and DSS-46 were included with DSS-46 range data. 
When it was recognized that the Guam TT&C data had large biases in several time periods with different 
multiples of 37.5 km, attempts were made to remove the biases of 400 to 600 km. Three segments of range data 
were isolated with a segment–specific bias applied. This is not a built–in feature of GTDS and is described in a 
similar use in Reference 1. This effort had progressed sufficiently to corroborate the orbit solution obtained from 
using the DSS–46 range, the DSS–46 and Guam angle data, and the USSTRATCOM solution vector as input. In 
later TDRS–3 recovery support, this segmented–range bias effort matured sufficiently so that biased range data from 
Guam was corrected enough to be used in an orbit solution. 
There was a 466 km difference between the WSC predicted reconstructed vector versus the USSTRATCOM 
post-maneuver vector, with 50 km of the error being in the cross–track component. There was a 4,324 km difference 
between the WSC predicted reconstructed vector and the TDRS-3 FDF operational no–burn ephemeris. This means 
there was a 4,324 km change in the orbit over 2 days, which reflects a drift of 3 degrees per day. It was later learned 
that the WSC reconstructed vector had a large error in the roll direction. 
2. TDRS-3 Lessons Learned 
TDRS tracking of a BRTS transponder requires a K-band space-to-ground link (SGL). Once a TDRS transitions 
to S-band during an emergency, it no longer maintains BRTS lock. When significant out-of-plane thrusting has 
occurred and BRTS events are not promptly resumed, additional tracking support will be required. Over a short arc 
with no maneuver modeling, the FDF may be unable to generate a reliable orbit solution based on TT&C data from 
one station after a large perturbation, unless additional steps are taken. The segmented–range bias modeling was 
able to salvage data that was 400 to 600 km off. Another step that could be taken is using range residual graphs as 
feedback to tune Delta–Velocity modeling after a preburn input vector, including 2– or 3–dimensional burn 
modeling, including out of plane burning. The burn modeling could be segmented into multiple burn times, if 
appropriate. Various orbit determination solution options and features were attempted throughout the recovery 
process. However, none of these produced a usable solution until the USSTRATCOM Two-Line Element (TLE) 
was available. 
III. Conclusion 
During a contingency situation, the expectation is that tracking would be performed from any asset available to 
support. FDF can attempt orbit determination when sufficient tracking data is available. However, there may be 
some limitations in the data that would reduce their effectiveness for orbit support, such as short data arcs, data 
dropouts from spacecraft spin, or even spacecraft related anomalies, or a lack of calibration of the tracking station 
equipment. If difficulty continues in generating an orbit solution, coordination and assistance from USSTRATCOM 
or additional measures may be sought. 
Contingency planning and extensive resources are strengths of the FDF. Drawing on experiences of launching 
and supporting hundreds of spacecraft missions, the FDF has built tools that permit data manipulation for 
contingencies and have the capability of using more than 23 data types to expand the possibilities of supporting new 
missions and aid in the recovery of spacecraft during spacecraft emergencies. FDF personnel analytical capabilities 
and experience also supply needed assistance during these endeavors. 
One of the primary objectives that FDF personnel use in planning critical orbit support is to build into the 
scenario the capability to use as many data types as possible due to possible contingencies with any one or more data 
types. In the past, FDF has put together critical orbit support schedules that included as many as five different data 
types. In one instance as many as three of these data types were not available for various reasons. Hence it is better 
to be prepared for such contingencies during these critical few hours. The fewer data types during critical support, 
the greater the risk. 
Recognition that greater resources and planning will prevent far greater expenditures to recover a mission from 
Spacecraft Emergency or other anomalous situations will result in long-term savings and may prevent an 
irrecoverable loss. 
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